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Abstract 
The chapter applies a historical institutionalist perspective to analyse the dynamics of 
market regulation in the European Union. It shows how an institutionalist perspective  
allows  a  d e e p  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f   the  feedback  loops  that  affected  the 
preferences of European stakeholders and transformed initially insignificant agreements 
into profound changes that became visible only with time. Using the internal market for 
network industries as an example, it hows how European regulation expanded and was 
transformed from a very limited and often non-binding set of policies to an integrated and 
wide-ranging framework that sees rules for liberalisation and re-regulation of competition, 
together with new EU-level regulators. The long-term perspective of historical 
institutionalism highlights that this incremental but profound change was possible because 
critical junctures, in particular judgments by the European Court of justice, allowed the 
European Commission and its allies to advance new policy proposals with a new default 
position. This in turn affected the preferences of major member states and created new 
coalitions. In addition, initial agreements led to the emergence of new actors. Taken 
together, the feedback loops reinforced the orientation of previous agreements and created 
changes that most observers would have qualified as impossible three or four decades ago. 
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Word count: 5634 words 
2  
An unusual political system, the European Union (EU) is frequently criticized by policy- 
makers and often has a negative image in public opinion. It is seen as overly complex, 
unable to adapt to changing political conditions, imposing centralized rules that are 
oftentimes inadequate for local conditions and subject to a high degree of squabbling and 
disagreement among EU member states.  Meanwhile, scholars see the EU as slow moving 
and weak. Its institutional structures are traditionally analyzed as the outcomes of 
decisions of powerful actors, be these through periodic intergovernmental ‘grand 
bargains’ (Moravcsik, 1998) or through pressures from transnational firms, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Commission (Sandholtz and Sweet, 1998).  
 
We focus on internal market regulation to highlight two puzzles about European 
integration given these two traditional theories. First, the scope of European regulatory 
authority has expanded considerably in the last three decades in ways that nobody would 
have predicted in the 1970s. To be sure, much of this expansion built on initial agreements 
among member states, as intergovernmentalism highlights, and benefitted from spill-overs 
and the activities of institutional European and private actors, as supranational 
institutionalism stresses. Yet it has also been led by public bodies, whose institutional 
features have themselves evolved over time. However, and this is the second puzzle, 
many of the dramatic changes over time emerged out of formal institutions that should 
have frustrated policy innovation. In a highly complex political system such as the EU, 
most formal agreements can only happen on the lowest common denominator, which 
rarely allows moving substantially away from the 
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status quo. But seemingly insignificant advances opened the way for substantial 
incremental change in a variety of areas, we will argue below, most importantly by 
helping to shift the preferences of powerful actors. 
 
Historical institutionalism provides tools to account for the evolutionary dynamics of 
internal market regulation and to explain how and why EU institutions have been greatly 
extended in scope, detail and depth over time. We argue that change has been marked by 
endogenous processes, as liberalization has stimulated re-regulatory rules and new 
organizations have sought to extend EU regulation. Although the processes have been 
slow and marked by bargaining, negotiation and compromise, they have led to a gradual 
or evolutionary development. We demonstrate how a historical institutionalist approach 
both helps to reveal these features and to explain them, and hence can in fact offer 
deep insights into the nature of the development of EU institutions. 
 
The chapter begins by setting out key elements of a historical institutionalist (HI) 
approach applied to the EU. It then sets out key characteristics of EU institutional 
development in the field of regulation of economic markets, since these are at the core of 
the EU. Several of these characteristics differ from both popular views of the EU and 
several academic analyses. Finally, it looks at how an HI analysis helps to explain the 
features found. 
 
 
Analyzing European integration and regulation 
 
Historical institutionalism is a well-developed framework of analysis that focuses our 
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attention on the influence of past institutional developments on present ones, on crucial 
junctures and ensuing path-dependence, and on the value of lengthy time periods to 
capture slow-moving processes (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 1992; Hall and Taylor, 
1996; Thelen, 1999; Pierson, 2000; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). It has demonstrated 
that preference formation is an endogenous process: actors behave rationally, but that 
rationality is in part at least a product of the wider institutional context (see Fioretos, 
Falleti and Sheingate, this volume).  
 
The key insights of the approach were developed to explain patterns within nation states. 
Yet, the scope for path dependence is likely to be great in the development of EU 
institutions (cf. Pierson, 1996). All four factors posited by Pierson (2000) for the 
importance of path dependence in politics apply in spades to the EU. To begin with, the 
nature of the EU is highly collective: many of the policies produced by the EU 
involve coordination of multiple participants, especially as inter-dependencies are high. 
The EU is marked by very dense politics, due to the high number of veto points and 
players. Equally, the reallocation of powers is likely to reinforce certain actors. Finally, 
the costs of setting up new institutions can be high, given the high number of actors 
involved. Developing what this means in a supranational context, this section highlights 
the institutional features of the EU that make historical institutionalism a particularly 
relevant perspective for understanding the evolution of EU regulation.  
 
First, a high number of veto players are a crucial feature of EU decision-making. 
Legislation can only be proposed by the Commission, but then must be passed by a 
qualified majority (with elements of a supermajority) by the Council of Ministers, and 
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today most also by the European Parliament. The ECJ can strike down legislation. The 
Commission itself is divided into Directorate Generals (DGs), headed by Commissioners 
nominated by national governments and whom the Commission President cannot 
remove. National governments face their own domestic veto players and points. 
Coordination among these different actors is therefore key to the success of a policy 
proposal, but equally difficult to achieve. 
 
This is linked to a second feature: the complexity and opacity of EU legislation, and 
especially European Community (EC) regulation.1 The subject matter of regulation is 
often highly technical. Its legal form can vary, from Directives that member states have to 
transpose into domestic legislation to Regulations and some Treaty articles that have 
direct effects in member states. Most EU regulation is implemented by member states by 
national regulatory authorities, which may be government departments or different kinds 
of independent regulatory agencies. Still, some areas, such as competition policy, are 
predominately managed by the Commission. To add complexity, different forms of 
coordination of national bodies are possible, from networks to European regulatory 
agencies (Coen and Thatcher, 2008). 
 
Over time, the need for coordination, technical cooperation and integration among 
multiple organisations have grown. These have resulted in a third feature: 
interdependencies and inter-linkages between formally separate national institutions and 
actors. Domestic agencies now connect in order to share information and coordinate their 
action. Regulatory ideas are frequently shared among strong professional and epistemic 
                                                          
1 European Community ( E C )  is used here since most regulation is under the EC ‘pillar’ of the EU. 
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communities. By encouraging comparisons and creating competitive contexts, the EU 
provides a political setting where developments in one member state increasingly affect 
the evolution of its neighbours. 
 
Fourth, there are multiple and often competing institutional legacies. This explains both 
the fault lines of individual conflicts, but also highlights that the costs of adaptation to a 
new EU regime can be unequally shared depending on the respective institutional fit. 
Each member state has its own specific institutional past. Thus for instance, France’s 
statist institutions and traditions stand in contrast with Britain’s economically liberal past 
and strong position in favour of finance capital, which in turn differ from neo-corporatist 
features seen in Germany and other Northern European countries (e.g. V. A. Schmidt, 
2002; Fioretos, 2011). In addition, there are competing legacies at the EU level: for 
example, between DGs in the Commission, where some sectoral DGs are more 
‘interventionist’, while others, such as DG Competition, is more economically liberal. 
 
Fifth, supranational law adds an additional layer of complexity and affects both the 
strategy of actors advocating or opposing policy change and the costs that can be 
incurred. More specifically, the highly legalized nature of the EU also means that courts, 
especially the ECJ, provide a source of change (Weiler, 1991;  Kelemen,  2011). This 
possibility is often used strategically by member states or European institutions such as 
the Commission to push for regulatory reform (S.K. Schmidt, 1998). As Kelemen (2011) 
highlights in a comparison between the adversarial legalism distinctive of the US and 
“eurolegalism”, European courts now play a crucial role in determining political conflict 
in ways much comparable to the American system. Regulatory dynamics are no longer 
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just cooperative and informal, marked by bureaucratic solution-finding. With the 
increasing possibility for private actors and other stakeholders to take cases to the 
European courts, litigation strategies profoundly shape regulatory development. This 
stands in contrast to some Western countries where political institutions have dominated 
regulation.  
 
These five features – a high number of veto-players, a complex EU regulatory process, 
interlinkages between national actors, competing institutional legacies and supranational 
law – have lasting effects on policy change that unfold over time and underscore the 
relevance of historical institutionalism. Studying the evolutionary dynamics of EU 
regulation highlights the co-existence of gradual change with some rare moments of rapid 
transformation caused by critical junctures. We argue that this is attributable to the fact 
that several defining features of the EU push towards the maintenance of the status quo 
(veto-players and complexity), while others encourage slow change (interlinkages) and 
can facilitate profound changes (diverse legacies and supranational law) in specific 
contexts. 
 
As a general rule, EU policy-making and its regulatory process make ‘evolutionary’ or 
‘gradual’ change highly likely, and a rapid change of direction and revolutionary reform 
rare. Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) modes of institutional change can all be observed in 
the EU. Layering is a common form of institutional development, as EU governance is 
multi-level and contains many veto actors who make contribute to new institutions being 
added to existing ones. Displacement is also an attractive strategy as new organisations 
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can slowly grow and use their own resources to expand their competencies and territory. 
The EU’s limited resources such as staffing and large budgets encourage ‘drift’ (i.e. 
deliberate neglect) and conversion of existing organizations. In contrast, terminating 
existing organizations can be very difficult, not only due to incumbent organisational 
interests but also because new legislation must pass through a legislative process with 
multiple veto points and players. 
 
Yet, as historical institutionalism points out, beyond such bounded change, new and 
unexpected directions of change can happen due to contingent events, which have been 
labelled “critical junctures”. The EU’s political system offers several sources for such 
contingent events. Its powerful courts provide a non-political source of change. Equally, 
the youth of many of its institutions and the expansion of its regulation may allow for 
contingent factors and new and unexpected developments. Finally, the contrasting and 
varied national institutional legacies may mean that there is more space for choice and 
contingency than for modern Western nation states. Indeed, interactions over time thanks 
to EU institutions may lead to actors altering their preferred policy positions, as we will 
develop below. 
 
Finally, institutional complexity also affects the rationality of actors, who are likely to be 
subject to multiple and potentially conflicting contexts. Many policy makers are playing 
at least a two-level game (Putnam, 1988), if not a multi-level one (Woll, 2012). Thus 
governments, national regulators and firms with powerful domestic bases are operating in 
both national domestic and EU policy arenas (as well sometimes as international and/or 
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regional ones), which can lead to shifting alliances across levels. 
 
 
The development of EU regulation of economic markets 
 
Until the 1970s, EC regulation of markets remained relatively limited. The focus was 
initially on the elimination of tariff barriers to trade. Later on, competition policy became 
another major activity, notably regulation of state aid and dumping, which were directly 
handled by the Commission. However, many economic markets were left to national 
governments, especially public services, notably network industries such as 
telecommunications, energy, stock markets and transport (Thatcher 2007). These were 
mostly state monopolies supplied by government-owned entities.  
 
The EC faced important constraints. The Commission was divided, with some elements in 
favour of greater competition, largely inspired by German ordo-liberalism, but other 
elements supporting industrial policy, notably in the form of promoting national and 
European champion firms, who would be large enough to meet feared competition from 
US or Japan. In any case, however, the EC seemed a weak regulatory body, with few 
legal powers. Legislative development was limited, especially due to the requirement for 
unanimity after the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, which followed De Gaulle’s 
‘empty chair’ approach, in which a de facto veto was given to all member states of 
‘matters of very important national interest’. The EC’s main activity was the provision of 
agricultural subsidies. 
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Thus by the early 1970s, the EU seemed to be destined to be a loose linkage of nations, at 
best a weak intergovernmental body. However, the 1970s and early 1980s saw a number 
of ‘critical junctures’ concerning regulation of economic markets. Many arose from 
judgments of the ECJ (Weiler, 1991; Caporaso and Stone Sweet, 1998; Fligstein, 
Sandholtz, and Stone Sweet, 2001). The most important was the 1979 Cassis de 
Dijon case, in which the court ruled that goods legally produced in one member state 
could be sold in other member states. “In the absence of common rules”, individual 
member states could set their own rules, but then meeting these empowered firms to 
export goods and services across the EC and other member states could not impose 
national restrictions that hindered trade (being caught by Article 28 [30]) except under 
limited circumstances (e.g. public morality, public policy or health and safety). Hence 
national rules provided a ‘passport’ across the EC (Nicolaïdis and Schmidt, 2007). In 
competition policy too, ECJ judgments were important, especially the 1972 Continental 
Can decision in which the Court offered a ‘backdoor’ entrance for the Commission to 
control mergers by applying Article 86 on abuse of a dominant position (Bulmer, 1994; 
McGowan and Cini, 1999). Other similar and unexpected ECJ decisions took place in 
telecommunications, such as the 1982 BT case, which gave the Commission ability to 
use its authority to regulate markets despite the absence of legislation. 
 
The 1980s saw major changes in the European Commission. Jacques Delors, its President 
from 1985 to 1995, despite being nominally a Socialist, took up the notion of the 
European Single Market and proposed the ‘1992 programme’, in which EC liberalisation 
would revitalize European economies. He formed an alliance with ‘economic liberals’ in 
which greater competition led by the EC would be married with re-regulation. At first, 
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liberalization measures appeared limited. EC legislation opened up parts of the 
telecommunications and energy markets, but left the bulk under national control (which 
often meant monopoly supply). Moreover, liberalization was counterbalanced by other 
‘re-regulatory measures’ that appeared to protect traditional ‘public service’. A Merger 
Regulation was passed in 1989 giving the Commission jurisdiction over the largest 
mergers, but its thresholds appeared very high at the time. 
 
The production of EC regulation was slow. Thus the 1989 Merger Regulation took 
almost twenty years, while telecommunications legislation began with a Green Paper 
in 1987 but then took almost a decade before the whole sector was liberalized (Bulmer, 
1994, Thatcher 2001). Negotiations were tortuous, often pitting ‘liberal’ states seeking 
extensions of EC law on competition (usually Britain and Germany) against ‘Southern’ 
states (often France and Italy) who supported more scope for industrial policies of 
favouring selected companies and protecting traditional ‘public service’ obligations, while 
the Commission sought greater powers for itself and for deepening economic integration. 
As a result of judicial strategies of pro-reform actors and shifting alliances that will be 
analysed below, different actors eventually reached agreement, including on the 
substantive content of regulation. 
 
Once seriously underway, EC regulation spread. Liberalisation was extended in the late 
1990s and 2000s across many economic markets, including their core. Thus by the end of 
the 2000s, the entire telecommunications, energy, airline and postal markets were opened 
to competition under EC law (Thatcher, 2007). Moreover, ‘re-regulatory’ measures 
became not only increasingly detailed but also designed to ensure that competition was 
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‘fair and effective’, concerning a host of matters from cost-based tariffs to 
interconnection. Equally, EC merger control was extendedby lower thresholds. Moreover, 
EC legislation began to encroach on national institutional structures, notably 
encouraging the establishment of independent regulatory agencies (and indeed 
requiring them in the case of electricity). Today, EC legislation over the internal 
markets has been greatly extended and runs counter to traditional monopolies and highly 
politicized interventions by national governments. The extension of EC regulation has 
involved much bargaining, negotiation and compromise, but even previously hostile 
countries such as France have accepted the principle of liberalization of markets. 
 
The EC also developed its coordination capacities convening implementation. The 1980s 
and 1990s saw the establishment of independent regulatory agencies in member states 
(Thatcher, 2002). These often had detailed powers over enforcement and hence held many 
responsibilities for implementing EC regulation in practice. Equally, they had incentives 
for further EC regulation since it increased their powers and also aided them in achieving 
independence in practice from governments. Initially, informal networks of independent 
regulatory agencies/authorities were created, either by the agencies themselves or 
helped by the Commission.2
  
However, over time, more formalized networks were 
                                                          
2 Examples of informal fora largely established by the Commission include the European Electricity 
Regulation Forum in 1998, and one year later the European Gas Regulation Forum (see Eberlein, 2005); 
examples  of informal  networks  of independent  regulatory  agencies  include  the Independent  Regulators 
Group (IRG) for telecommunications  in 1997, the Forum of European Securities Commissions in 1997, and 
the Council of European Energy Regulators in 2000. 
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established under EC law (Thatcher and Coen, 2008).3 
 
As the Commission (and some national governments) became concerned about consistent 
implementation, to avoid member states ‘cheating’ by selective implementation of EC 
regulation, the power of regulatory agencies increased. This created a complex 
relationship with the Commission, as both it and the networks sought greater EC 
regulation, but the networks and their IRA members also wished to ensure sufficient 
distance from the Commission. After lengthy debates, involving both actors, as well as 
national governments, integrated European Regulatory Agencies (ERAs) were created in 
2009-10, such as the European Banking Authority and the Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (Thatcher, 2011). However, they were given limited formal powers, 
and faced many constraints, notably dual boards – one for national government 
representatives and another for agency representatives of independent regulatory 
agencies. Nevertheless, they the ERA rapidly began to extend their operations. The 
European Banking Authority, for example, has been an important participant in efforts 
to reregulate banking in the aftermath of the financial crisis throughout Europe. 
 
By 2012 EC regulation has been transformed in ways that were unexpected in the 
1970s. It had been extended in scope and detail, covering many sectors, and including 
liberalization, re-regulation of competition, and implementation and coordination of 
national regulatory agencies/bodies. Each stage had been followed by another that built on 
                                                          
3 For example, the Committee of European Securities Regulators, CESR (2001), the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors, CEBS (2003), and the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas, ERGEG (see 
Thatcher and Coen, 2008). 
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the previous one. Development had been slow and incremental, through negotiation and 
compromise, strategic manoeuvring and sometimes unexpected feedback loops created by 
moments of critical juncture that shifted the basis of negotiation of all participants. We 
will analyse these mechanisms in order to clarify the theoretical insights from historical 
institutionalism in the following section.  
 
 
Insights from historical institutionalism 
 
The longer time horizon of historical institutionalism offers a very different perspective 
than those focusing on recent changes or isolated ‘grand bargains’ during Treaty changes. 
It shows that EC regulation has developed greatly over time, in terms of coverage of 
different markets, extension of liberalization and provisions for implementation. It offers 
an immensely valuable lens for understanding a polity that has grown incrementally, with 
a series of small steps, through limited agreements, but resulted in outcomes that were not 
foreseen at the start of the process. 
 
Secondly, a longer-term view brings attention to the role of critical junctures in shaping 
the evolution of EU regulation. The path of the 1960s and 1970s stands is in sharp 
contrast to that of the 1980s onwards. As the previous overview highlighted, critical 
junctures arose most notably from ECJ judgements and the activism of senior figures in 
the Commission. Moreover, we can analyse how specific actors exploited critical 
junctures to orient future developments and forge new coalitions. To begin with, the ECJ 
acted when normal legislative progress seemed impossible, offering legal alternatives 
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through application of existing Treaty provisions. In addition, the Commission was able to 
offer new reform programmes that appeared to serve the interests of national governments 
and to be of rather limited scope. 
 
Put more theoretically, the critical junctures opened up by court rulings were crucial for 
two reasons. First, they changed the default position that negotiators could previously fall 
back on. With new legal interpretation, “business as usual” was often precluded and 
conservative actors had to determine new policy stances, which oftentimes brought 
realignments. Second, the European Commission exploited these junctures by proposing 
new legislation in response to court cases. Proposals that would previously not have 
passed because a majority of member states might have preferred the status quo, were 
now able to garner more significant support. This explains many of the most significant 
changes in network industries such as electricity, telecommunications or air transport (S. 
K. Schmidt, 1998; Eising and Jabko, 2001; Woll, 2006). The evolution of preferences, 
endogenous to the process of European integration, are thus a major motor of further 
institutionalization. Historical institutionalism has long drawn attention to the need to 
endogenize the political construction of interests into models of change. As Immergut 
(1998: 20) underlines, “institutions act as filters that selectively favour particular 
interpretations either of […] goals or […] means.” When court judgements or 
Commission proposals changed default options or provided new institutional fora for 
negotiation, political actors adjusted their strategies, and sometimes even their 
overarching goals. 
 
Thirdly, not only the traditional decision-makers, but also new actors triggered positive 
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feedback processes. Once liberalization began, it generated strong forces for the 
extension of EC regulation, notably for re-regulation and later concerning implementation 
through spill-over effects: rules in one domain or part of a domain create pressures for 
further rules in adjoining domains or to re-regulate the newly liberalized market (Vogel, 
1996; Fligstein, Sandholtz, and Stone Sweet, 2001). Moreover, new organizations, such as 
loose networks of national regulatory agencies, began to press for further powers. Thus, 
new actors that arose of initial intervention (both at the EU level and at the national 
level) developed their own interests, joined coalitions and pressed for changes that 
increase their powers and extend EC regulation. Similarly, once European networks of 
regulators were created, they then gave rise to further processes of centralization and 
formalization, which have contributed to the creation of European regulatory agencies. 
These feedback effects are vital for understanding the EU, as initial, apparently limited 
changes can develop over time and often incrementally into far-reaching reforms. 
Historical institutionalism offers powerful insights into such processes. 
 
Although neo-functionalist scholarship has greatly underlined the rise of new 
transnational actors, HI analyses add to their analyses by pointing to the space for 
political actors such as the Commission, independent regulatory authorities and networks 
of such authorities to undertake changes which, thanks to these feedback processes 
created dynamics that were not foreseen at the outset and that do not correspond fully to 
the market integration demands of the transnational actors alone. In addition, sometimes 
even limited institutions that correspond only to the lowest common denominator led to 
consequential changes in institutional design and market integration that developed their 
own organisational logics and paths. This does not imply that powerful actors were blind-
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sided or did not act strategically, on the contrary! Most decision-makers involved were 
large and well resourced. Rather than following scripts blindly, they continuously 
evaluated their interests in the face of changing political contexts and consider different 
institutional alternatives. They bargain hard to pursue their preferred solutions. Policy 
preferences had to integrate changing fall-back options and shifting alliances, the arrival 
of new actors and competitive dynamics unleashed by previous decisions. This leads to 
surprising changes in the position of countries such as France, for example, who initially 
opposed liberalization, or the United Kingdom, which initially resisted further integration, 
including financial services. The interests of some regulatory agencies also evolved, 
towards accepting greater formalization under EC law. Correspondingly, we can find the 
main economic actors, the former monopoly providers and other private companies, 
change their policy stances in response to changing competition dynamics and shifts in 
the position of their national governments (Woll, 2008). 
 
Fourthly, historical institutionalism points to the evolutionary nature of EC regulatory 
development. Existing organizations usually survive. They are often converted (with 
additional powers and formalization) or sometimes new organizational forms may be 
layered on top. The process of development is fraught with conflict, as different actors 
jostle and have their interests partially overlap but also partially conflict, leading to 
relationships of limited cooperation and also conflict. In many ways, the growing 
institutional complexity that arises from incrementalism and compromise can be 
compared to developments in American politics, where scholars have labeled the tension 
between overlapping sources of authority “intercurrence” (see Fioretos, Falleti, Sheingate, 
this volume). The American government, just like the institutions governing market 
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regulation in Europe, grow because a multitude of actors seek to preserve their 
respective authorities over a policy domain and to broker institutions that allow for 
compromise and co-existence. The rationalisation of practices is the exception.  
 
However, there is one crucial difference between the American and European regulatory 
development that is linked to the policy cycle and the passage rate of legislative 
proposals. While the great majority of legislative proposals are abandoned in the US, 
Commission proposals have a very high chance of being adopted eventually, even if they 
may undergo considerable changes during long negotiation periods.4
 
This means that one 
should not overestimate the importance of bargaining, delay and compromise in the EU. 
Paying too much attention to these features risks missing two crucial aspects that matter 
for outcomes in the long run: (1) most often, even protracted EU negotiations lead to 
some sort of agreement and (2) however limited the agreement may seem initially, it is 
likely to involve greater EC regulation, in particular as it plays out over time. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Historical institutionalism draws attention to several features of EC regulation that are 
unexpected or downplayed in other frameworks with the help of theoretically-grounded 
explanatory factors. The long term time horizon sheds light on two parallel and surprising 
evolutionary dynamics: on the one hand, the forces resisting change that lead to gradual 
                                                          
4 Mahoney (2008: 64) estimate that only 10 percent of legislative proposals were passed as bills by the US 
Congress in 2008, compared to roughly 80 percent of European proposals which eventually turned into 
directives or regulations. 
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change and layered institutions, on the other hand, mechanisms that facilitate profound 
shifts. In particular, the strategic interactions of domestic actors, supranational institutions 
and new transnational actors and their use of European institutions lead to critical 
junctures, which create feedback loops and inform further institutional development. 
Much of this evolution operates through sometimes marginal shifts in actors’ preferences, 
but in the complex interplay of multi-level policy bargaining, these feedback loops can 
create quite fundamental change over time. 
 
Nevertheless, it is valuable to conclude by highlighting the limitations of an historical 
institutionalist approach, if only to suggest areas for development. One concerns the 
definition of actor interests. As anyone doing empirical work on changing preferences 
will quickly find out, it is almost impossible to distinguish basic interests from altered 
strategies in pursuit of the same interests. Only in rare cases do actors acknowledge 
having completely changed their mind about fundamental goals. This may be important 
if deeper questions of actor objectives are at stake. Equally, it matters for discussions of 
whether actors’ identity is altered by interactions such as bargaining and negotiations, 
which is at the heart of debates concerning identity in constructivism. 
 
A second issue concerns identification of a path (cf. Deeg 2005). Although changes in 
direction can be seen after long time periods, greater definition of what constitutes a path 
would greatly aid in identifying critical junctures and especially the timing of path 
change, which then would be valuable in analysing actor strategies, coalitions and roles. 
 
Finally, historical institutionalism pays too little attention to informal arrangements that 
help to balance or off-set formal rules and organizations. On the one hand, formal 
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institutions may only create policy effects because they are complemented by informal 
procedures, as Kleine (2013) shows, arguing that formal rules alone would be 
unacceptable to many stakeholders in the EU and would bring integration to a stand-still. 
On the other hand, informal governance reinforces learning and feedback effects in ways 
that are more subtle than the ones previously described. Sabel and Zeitlin (2010) argue 
that even non constraining agreements, such as the open method of coordination, can 
create recursive processes, where comparison and learning pushes for a convergence of 
standards that eventually make formal arrangements possible. A more complete historical 
institutionalist account of European market integration needs to consider such non- 
constraining informal procedures on equal footing with formal institutional development. 
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